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1 Introduction
When does intra-elite conict result in democracy? Several strands of research emphasize
the importance of intra-elite bargaining in the transition to democracy. Moore (1964) argues
that a fundamental precondition for stable democracy is a balance of power between landed
upper class and urban bourgeoisie, while totalitarian regimes arise whenever one class
dominates the others. Bardhan (1984) studies the capacity of the democracy to manage
the conict between elites. Olson (1993) notes: We can deduce (...) that autocracy
is prevented and democracy permitted by the accidents of history that leave a balance of
power or stalemate- a dispersion of force or resources that makes it impossible for any leader
or group to overpower all of the others. And Collier (1999) underlines the central role of
political or economic elitesbargaining in almost all processes of transition to democracy.1
This paper studies the conditions under which democracy is the outcome of intra-elite
conict. Two risk averse elites compete for the appropriation of a unit of social surplus
with initial uncertainty about their future relative bargaining power. In order to credibly
commit to insure each other against future imbalances in relative bargaining power, the
two elites surrender some of their decision power to the numerically large but weak non-
elites. We characterize the ex-ante choice of democracy as both franchise extension to,
and lowering the cost of collective political action for, an initially disorganized (i.e. unable
to act collectively) non-elite. We show that both these features are necessary for the two
elites to credibly commit to insure each other against future uncertain imbalances in relative
bargaining power and we derive su¢ cient conditions for democracy to prevail in equilibrium.
Our analysis proceeds by backward induction, and it begins at the point where all
uncertainty about relative bargaining power between the two elites has been resolved. We
show that in a democracy, if the voting outcome is renegotiated, the organized (i.e. able to
engage in a collective action) non-elite and the weaker elite will only ever form a coalition
with each other to bargain with the stronger elite. Any gain in bargaining power by allying
with the stronger elite is temporary as eventually either of these two classes will have to
1Section 4 is devoted to a detailed analysis of the empirical evidence.
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bargain with the stronger elite on their own.
Next, we determine surplus division at the voting stage. If there is no franchise extension
to the non-elite, the resulting surplus division will exclude the non-elite, while ensuring that
the weaker elite obtains enough surplus to avoid a coalition formation with the non-elite.
Therefore, in this case, the non-elite will have no incentive to get even partially organized
in the rst instance. With franchise extension, the median voter will belong to the non-
elite and the resulting surplus will be pinned down, via backward induction, by surplus
division resulting from coalition formation at the renegotiation stage. Therefore, both
franchise extension to, and lowering the cost of collective political action for, the non-elite
are necessary elements in any ex-post credible insurance commitment between the two
elites.
Before uncertainty is resolved,2 anticipating a coalition with the weaker elite, we show
that there are two equilibrium outcomes in the collective action problem faced by non-
elite individuals: one where no non-elite individual engages in collective political activity
("individualist" equilibrium) and the other where every non-elite individual engages in
collective political activity ("collectivist" equilibrium).3 Thus, non-elite individuals face
strategic uncertainty. We adapt an equilibrium selection argument (stochastic stability,
Young (1993)) that picks the equilibrium that is more likely to prevail in the presence of
strategic uncertainty4 and we show that lowering the cost of collective activity ensures that
the collectivist equilibrium emerges.
Finally, when the bargaining power of a fully organized non-elite is small relative to the
degree of risk aversion of the two elites, both elites unanimously choose democracy.
Bardhan (1984) provides a useful description of how the threat of coalition formation
between the elite and the non-elite works in practice in a democracy:
Populist rhetoric has been a useful weapon in clipping the wings of an over-
greedy bargaining partner [...] profuse tears of commiseration with the masses
[...] have drowned a rivals extravagant claims. If the industrialists at any time
overstep in their bargaining, sure enough there will be an uproar in the Par-
2We justify the timing of collective activity in section 2.3 below.
3In our set-up, consistent with Olson (1965), selective incentives resolve the free-riding problem involved
in collective action.
4In the language of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), the selected equilibrium is risk-dominant.
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liament about the anti-people conspiracy of the monopoly capitalists; similar
invectives against the kulaksor, somewhat less frequently, against the para-
sitic intelligentsiawill also be aired on appropriate occasions. The competitive
politic of democracy thus serves the purpose of keeping rival partners in the
coalition on the defensive(P. Bardhan 1984 pp. 77).
Two examples, drawn from the histories of Indian and French democracy, are a useful
illustration of the coalition dynamics underlined in our model. In India, Indira Gandhis
attempt to mount a coup (by imposing "Emergency") in 1975 culminated with the lost
of the enormous popular support she had hitherto enjoyed and indeed, she called and
lost elections in 1977. Even though she promised more redistribution to the non elite,
this commitment was not credible and an alliance consisting of the non-elite with anti-
Congress parties opposed her.5 In France, universal male su¤rage was introduced in 1848.
When a social reform agenda was passed thanks to the alliance between the working class
and Republicans, a conservative government disenfranchised 2.8 million of men in 1850.
However, in 1851 the Republicans and the working class supported the coup led by Louis
Napoleon Bonaparte, who restored the universal su¤rage, initially only formally and from
1868, under the pressure of Republicans and working classes more substantially (Collier
1999, pp. 42-43 and Elwitt pp. 41) also by abolishing the previously imposed ban on
organized political activity.
A possible objection to our argument is that stable democracy is not a necessary out-
come of intra-elite conict in heterogenous societies as in many African countries. In an
extension to the main model, we consider scenarios where, due to linguistic or ethnic dif-
ferences, there are vertical links between one elite and a section of the non-elite. With
such vertical links, we show that a vertical bias in coalition formation between elites and
sections of the non-elite could indeed prevent democratization.
The model emphasizes how democracy is characterized by both full enfranchisement
and legalization of political activity and that both these elements are necessary. Indeed all
constitutions of the countries commonly considered democratic explicitly recognize freedom
of collective organization as well as the universal right to vote (in the last section we provide
a sample of the relevant articles concerning freedom of organization). And in fact, in the
5The Janata Party won the 1977 elections.
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modern democracies, the mass parties supporting the non elites started to form immediately
after the extension of the franchise.6 Furthermore, political scientists have documented that
in many dictatorship individuals have the right to vote (and often massively participate
in elections) without having real freedom of association,7 and that criteria used to dene
democracies must include not just the right to vote but also the existence of e¤ectively
competing collective political organizations.8
We emphasize the e¤ect of the institutions, specically freedom of organization, in
shaping individual incentives to act collectively. There is a similar concept, the political
opportunity structure, developed in the sociology literature (see e.g. Tilly (1978), McAdam
(1982), Tarrow (1998)). This concept is based on the idea that the state with its institution
determined the opportunity of the collective action. Tarrow (1998), p. 20, argues that
contentious Politics emerges when ordinary citizens, (...), responds to op-
portunity that lowers the cost of collective action, reveal potential allies, show
where elites and authorities are most vulnerable and trigger social networks and
collective identities into action around common themes..
There is a related political economy literature which has raised fundamental issues re-
garding the transition to democracy. Seminal papers in this literature include Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000, 2001), Conley and Temini (2001), Fleck and Hanssen (2002), Just-
man and Gradstein (1999) and like in our paper, in a framework with intra-elite conict
Lizzeri and Persico (2004), Llavador and Oxoby (2005). All above mentioned papers view
the transition to democracy as consisting of franchise extension. Our paper di¤ers from this
literature as it emphasizes both franchise extension and lowering the cost of collective po-
litical activity as necessary elements in the transition to democracy, so that, in equilibrium,
voting outcomes are not renegotiated.9
6See, for example, Epstein (1967).
7Przeworski et Al. (2000) classies dictatorship with the elections as "mobilizing dictatorship". In
their database, containing observation in the period 1950-90, there are 147 mobilizing over a total of 274
di¤erent dictatorships.
8See Hermert (1978) for a systematic outline of the di¤erences between competitive and non-competitive
elections. Along similar line, but even more restrictive is Dahl (1989), who provides a series of requirement
a real democracy must fulll.
9Some other models analyzing issues related to democratization include Bertocchi (2003), Galor and
Moav (2006), Laguno¤ and Jack (2005), Ticchi and Vidigni (2003) among others.
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The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the main model. Section 3
analyzes some extensions of the model. Section 4 is devoted to the discussion, using our
model and its results, of comparative historical and institutional evidence relating to India
and the pattern of democratization in some Western European countries. Section 5 o¤ers
some nal remarks. Some of the more technical material is contained in the appendix.
2 The model
We study a model with three classes of homogeneous agents, E1; E2;W , where Ei, i = 1; 2,
denotes the two elites and W represents the numerically large non-elite. There are three
time periods, t = 0; 1; 2: The measure of disposable social surplus is normalized to one.
The two elites E1 and E2 are assumed to be initially organized: each individual in E1
and E2 can credibly commit to act collectively. In contrast, the non-elite W is initially
completely disorganized: no individual inW can commit to act collectively. In order to act
collectively, each individual has to join an organization (a party) and we assume that party
membership has a privately borne participation utility cost c for each individual.10 Only
individuals who act collectively are able to appropriate a portion of the disposable surplus.
The portion of surplus appropriated by the organized individuals in a class is invested to
provide a collective good that only those individuals consume.11
At t = 0, the two elites, by unanimous consent, choose whether or not democratize.
Democracy has two elements:
a) Enfranchisement of each individual in W , so that she has right to vote at t = 1;
b) Legalizing collective political activity for individuals in W which lowers the privately
borne cost of party membership from c to some level c where c > c > 0.
10We assume that c is a sunk cost. We can think of it as an initial cost to get in touch and establish a
communication channel with the other members. For a discussion of the timing party formation see section
2.3 below.
11Note that in this model, we do not make a distinction between joining the party and acting collectively
in support of the party, as we assume that only party members can act collectively. This allows to
simplify the exposition since it implies that all individuals who act collectively obtain the same payo¤. A
more realistic model discriminating between party members and non-party members who choose to act
collectively would not change qualitative features of our results.
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Once the decision of whether or not to extend democracy has been made, each individual
in W decides whether or not to join the party.
The relative power of E1 and E2 is uncertain at t = 0 and is determined at t = 1 by ,
a random variable, where
 =
8<: 1 prob. q2 prob. 1  q :
The interpretation is that when  = i, elite Ei can appropriate the entire unit of disposable
surplus in any bilateral bargain with Ej.12 The variable q can be interpreted as an index of
power between the two elites, so that when q = 1
2
, the two elites are symmetric and neither
is dominant. For expositional simplicity, we initially solve the model under the case q = 1
2
,
then in section 3.2, we study the consequences of relaxing this assumption.
At t = 1, the relative bargaining strength of the two elites becomes common knowledge.
The pool of voters, by majority voting, decide a surplus allocation for each of the three
classes.
At t = 2, either one of the two elites on their own or any other coalition of classes may
reject the voting outcome and renegotiate the surplus allocation determined by majority
voting at t = 1. Consumption takes place at the end of t = 2:
Preferences over consumption of the collective good are represented by the smooth
utility function u : <+ ! < where u0(:) > 0 > u00(:) i.e. agents are strictly risk averse and
payo¤ are normalized so that u(0) = 0. The payo¤ of a organization member in W from
consuming x  0 is u(x)  c.
The total number of individuals has a mass of 1 + 2; with the mass of W equal to 1
and the mass of each elite equal to  with 2 < 1 so that with enfranchisement, the median
voter belongs to W .
We solve the model by backward induction.
2.1 Renegotiation and coalition formation at t = 2
LetW  denote a situation where there is a fraction  of individuals inW who join the party
so that  is a measure of the level of organization in W; with higher values of  denoting
12One can think at this as a shock increasing the value of the production factor owned by one elite, for
example an increase of oil price, and this wealth can be used to buy guns or to hire an army.
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a higher level of organization. When  = 0 individuals in W are completely disorganized,
act individually and therefore, neither E1 nor E2 can form a coalition with W .
At t = 2, in the renegotiation phase that ensures after the outcome of majority voting
is rejected, the timing of events is as follows:
1. If a single class has objected, the two classes who did not objected decide whether
or not to form a coalition. If no coalition is formed, the objecting class bargains rst
with one and then with the other, and each class has an equal probability of being
the rst.
2. If two classes form a coalition to reject the winning proposal, rst, the coalition
bargains with the excluded class and then, bargain with each other over the surplus
appropriated in the preceding round of bargaining.
For each  > 0, let   denote the set of all admissible coalitions excluding the grand
coalition.13 For each  2  , let   () denote the set of admissible coalitions which excludes
any class already contained in :14 We assume that in any process of bargaining between
two classes or between a class and a coalition of classes, the outcome is determined by a
grabbing function g(; 0; ) measuring the share of the available surplus  is able to extract
in a bilateral bargain with 0 2   () given . For  2  , 0 2   (), the interpretation is
that in any bilateral bargain, bargaining power is equivalent to the amount of the available
surplus that  can grab relative to 0. Clearly, g(; 0; ) = 1   g(0; ; ). Consistent
with the assumption that conditional on  = i, Ei is the stronger elite, we assume that
g(Ei; Ej; i) = 1 and for simplicity we assume that the stronger elite is able to extract the
entire surplus even from a fully organized non elite, g(Ei;W 1; i) = 1:15
In the main text, we treat the grabbing function as a primitive; however, in the appendix,
we endogenize this grabbing function via a process of recursive Nash bargaining where the
power of a class or coalition of classes is reected in the way disagreement points are
specied.
13More formally:   = ffWg ; fE1g ; fE2g ; fW; E1g ; fW; E2g ; fE1; E2gg
14Formally, for any two classes i; j 2 ,   () = f0 2   : i =2 0 or j =2 0g.
15This assumption simplify the exposition, but it is not necessary to our argument as long as both
g(Ei; Ej ; i) and g(W 1; Ei; i) are su¢ ciently small.
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Let f() denote the nal surplus (in terms of collective good) W is able to appropriate
after forming a coalition with Ej against Ei and then bargaining with Ej on its own, where
f() = g (fW ; Ejg ; Ei; i) g(W ; Ej; i)
In what follows we will assume that the more organized W is, the higher is its bargaining
power against the weaker elite and the bargaining power of the coalition between weaker
elite and non eliteboth g (fW ; Ejg ; Ei; i) and g(W ; Ej; i) are increasing in ; hence
f() is also increasing in . As  ! 0; W  bargaining power goes to zero as well and in
the limit, lim!0 g(W ; Ej; i) = lim!0 f() = 0.
Note that no individual (whether or not a party member) in W  will obtain any share
of the available surplus if it joins a coalition with the stronger elite. For this reason,
anticipating a coalition with the stronger elite, for each individual in W it is a dominant
strategy not to join the party (and pay a participation cost c > 0).
On the other hand, if  > 0, each party member in W  will have an incentive to
form a coalition with Ej and Ej will have an incentive to form a coalition with W . It
follows that when  > 0, the payo¤ to Ei is 1   g (fW ; Ejg ; Ei; i), the payo¤ to Ej
is g () = g (fW ; Ejg ; Ei; i) g(Ej;W ; i) and the payo¤ each individual in W is f() =
g (fW ; Ejg ; Ei; i) g(W ; Ej; i).
As the degree of organization only a¤ect payo¤s at the renegotiation stage, at time 2,
the payo¤ to each individual in W belonging to the party of size  is u(f())   c while
the payo¤ from not joining the organization is 0. As u(0) = 0 and u(:) is continuous and
lim!0 f() = 0, lim!0 u(f()) = 0. Moreover, as u0(:) > 0, and f() is continuous and
increasing in , u(f()) is also continuous and increasing in .
Therefore, condition
u(f(1)) < c (1)
implies that when forming new organizations is illegal, it is a dominant action for each
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individual in W not to join the organization:16 On the other hand,
u(f(1)) > c (2)
is a necessary condition for the party formation in W . In what follows we assume that the
inequalities (1) and (2) always hold.
2.2 Equilibrium enfranchisement
In this section, we study (i) surplus division at t = 1, the voting stage and (ii) the ex-ante
decision of individuals in W to form a party at t = 0 and (iii) the ex-ante decision of the
two elites to extend democracy at t = 0.
Voting at t = 1
Fix  = i. Let  =
 
Ei ; Ej ; W

denote a surplus sharing rule where Ei (respectively,
Ej) is the portion of the surplus appropriated by Ei (respectively, Ej) and W is the is the
portion of the surplus appropriated by W . If there is no democracy,  = 0 and the only
possible surplus division is Ei = 1, Ej = W 0 = 0 as any other division will be rejected
by the strongest elite. With democracy, the median voter is in W and the winning sharing
rule is Ei = 1   g ()   f (), Ej = g () and W = f (): by backward induction, if
W > f (), either of the two elites will object and following such an objection, W  will
form a coalition with Ej and obtain f ().
Note that if the two elites legalize W 0s party but do not extend franchise, there will
be no party formation in equilibrium. Assume on the contrary that  > 0. Then, the
equilibrium surplus sharing would be Ei = 1  g (), Ej = g () and W = 0 as surplus
division will exclude the non-elite while ensuring that the weaker elite will extract g() by
threatening to form a coalition withW  at the renegotiation stage but ex-ante no individual
in W  would ever join the party since W = 0.
Moreover if the two elites extend franchise, but do not lower the cost of joining the
party, so that c = c, given assumption (1)  = 0 and the surplus allocation would be
Ei = 1, Ej = W 0 = 0 : enfranchising individuals in W; on its own has no real e¤ect
16The robustness of our results when this assumption is relaxed is discussed in more detail in section 2.3
below.
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since any decision who attribute an allocation di¤erent than the one in oligarchy would
be rejected by the stronger elite and renegotiated. Therefore, both lowering the cost of
political activity and enfranchisement are necessary to achieve a surplus sharing di¤erent
than the one in oligarchy.
Party formation at t = 0
In a democracy, collective political organization is legal and any member of W can join
the organization at cost c; hence given assumption (2), if individuals in W anticipate a
coalition with the weaker elite then there is a threshold ^ > 0 with u(f(^)) = c; such that
(a) if an individual in W believes that a fraction  > ^ will join the party, it is dominant
for him to join as well, (b) if he believes that there is fraction  < ^ joining the party,
then it is a dominant action for him not to join as well. It follows that party formation
is characterized by a threshold and there are two symmetric equilibria17 in the collective
action game being played by individuals in W : one where no individual in W joins the
organization (let us call it "individualist" equilibrium) and another where every individual
in W will join the organization (we call it "collectivist" equilibrium).
Which of these two equilibria prevail? We develop an equilibrium selection argument
that selects the prevailing equilibrium as a function of c, the cost collective political activity
with enfranchisement. Specically, we show that without enfranchisement, the "individu-
alist" equilibrium is selected while with enfranchisement, the "collectivist" equilibrium is
selected.
Lemma 1 In the party formation game played by individuals in W , the collectivist equi-
librium is selected if and only if ^ < 1
2
.
Proof. See appendix.
The key premise underlying the equilibrium selection argument used here (Harsanyi
and Selten (1988) and Young (1993)) is that individuals in W face strategic uncertainty
as there are multiple equilibria in the party formation game. Each individual assesses the
likelihood of other individuals choosing actions according to either equilibrium under the
assumption that other individuals make a mistake with some small probability and, given
17We ignore the asymmetric equilibrium where ^ fraction of individuals in W join the party and 1   ^
fraction do not as it is never stable and has a empty basin of attraction.
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these beliefs, choose their own actions optimally. The selected equilibrium is the one which
is more likely to prevail in the presence of such strategic uncertainty. In the language of
Harsanyi and Selten (1988), the selected equilibrium has the larger basin of attraction and
is risk-dominant.
Note that as u(f()) is continuous and increasing in , ^ is an increasing function of c
and therefore, the condition that ^ < 1
2
can be equivalently stated as a condition that c is
low enough. The following proposition summarizes the above discussion:
Proposition 2 . If the cost of joining a organization in democracy, c; is su¢ ciently low,
all individuals in W will join the organization anticipating coalition formation with the
weaker of the two elites at the renegotiation stage and a share f () at the voting stage.
Democracy at t = 0
Next, we study the choice of democracy at t = 0. To simplify notation, let f(1)  f and
g(1)  g. As the two elites are identical ex-ante, both of them will agree to a democracy
if and only if the inequality holds:
1
2
u(1) +
1
2
u(0)  1
2
u(1  g   f) + 1
2
u(g) . (3)
We can therefore state
Proposition 3 A necessary condition for E1 and E2 to democratize is that both elites are
risk-averse. When both elites are risk-averse and f is small enough (relative to the degree
of risk-aversion of u(:)), the transition to democracy is Pareto e¢ cient. .
Proof. See appendix.
Consider the case where individuals are risk neutral. In this case, as there are no gains
from risk-sharing and f > 0, the expected utility of either elite at t = 0 (before their
relative bargaining power is revealed) in oligarchy is higher than the expected utility in
democracy. However, when elites are risk averse, there is a net gain in having a smoother
consumption pattern across the two states, therefore, when f is not too large relative to
degree of risk-aversion, the expected utility in Democracy could well be strictly higher than
the expected utility in Oligarchy.
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2.3 Discussion
1. Cost of collective action:
In the preceding analysis, we assumed that u(f) < c so that there was no organization
formation in W without democracy. This is a simplifying assumption. When u(f) > c, an
implication the equilibrium selection argument presented here is that as long as c is high
enough to ensure that  (c), the solution to the equation u(f()) = c, is strictly greater
than 1
2
, our results continue to hold.
2. The timing of party formation:
What is the role of the timing of party formation in obtaining our democratization
result? We have assumed that individuals in W form a party at t = 0 before the elites
know their own relative bargaining power. We argue that no other timing makes sense and
given the choice of when to form a party, party formation will take place at t = 0. Suppose
party formation takes place after elites know their relative bargaining strength. Then, the
stronger elite will always have an incentive to increase c in order to prevent party formation
and thus coalition formation between the weaker elite and individuals in W . In our model,
the cost c of party membership is a sunk cost and party members pay it only once at the
time the party is formed. What in e¤ect, we are assuming, is that the stronger elite will
nd too costly to break-up an existing party already formed at t = 0: if this isnt the case,
the party in W will be broken up and democratization will reversed. Therefore, given the
choice of when to form a party, party formation will take place at t = 0.
3. Repeated interaction and renegotiation:
Is our democratization result robust to repeated interaction between competing elites?
On the face of it, folk theorem type arguments suggest that repeated interaction between
competing elites in Oligarchy, should lead to e¢ cient risk sharing between elites. However,
there are at least two reasons why a folk theorem type argument may not apply here. First,
the discount factor may be bounded away from 1 because, for instance, the gap between
successive rounds of play (in our model, in Oligarchy, a round of play would have an ex-
ante stage and ex-post stage of coalition formation and bargaining) is large. Second, the
strategy proles that support risk-sharing between elites may not be renegotiation-proof.
Indeed, in our paper, there is a single e¢ cient risk-sharing allocation between the two
elites namely that at each value of , each elite appropriates half the social surplus in each
round of play. Notice that for a strategy prole to be renegotiation proof, it would have
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to result in the e¢ cient allocation after any history of play. However, any strategy prole
that supports e¢ cient risk-sharing along the equilibrium path of play must involve some
payo¤ loss for the stronger elite in the continuation game that follows on from the history
where the stronger elite reneges on e¢ cient risk-sharing, a contradiction.
3 Elite conict without democracy
In this section, in contrast to the preceding analysis, we examine two di¤erent scenarios
where intra-elite conict doesnt necessarily lead to democratization: vertical biases in
coalition formation and dominant elites.
3.1 Ethnic conict
As already argued in the introduction, intra-elite conict doesnt necessarily lead to stable
democracy, especially when decolonization generates states that are populated by di¤erent
social groups characterized by strong vertical links (like ethnic and linguistic links). In
what follows, we show that with vertical bias, the conditions for democracy to emerge in
equilibrium, derived in the preceding two sections, need to be qualied.
We model ethnic groups and ethnic conict as follows. Assume that W is partitioned
into subgroups W1 and W2 , such that each individual in Wi is that gets a negative utility
 bi, where bi > 0, whenever it forms a coalition with elite Ej; otherwise, (for example, if it
doesnt form a coalition, or if it forms a coalition with elite Ei, j 6= i), bi = 0. We assumed
that individuals have incentive to act collectively when anticipating a coalition with the
weaker elite, u(f) > c. However, if u(f) < c: + bi, for all c 2 fc; cg, clearly no individual
in Wi will form a coalition with Ej; and, assuming that the size of group Wi is greater
than half, then for  = i; the fraction of individuals who act collectively is less than 1
2
and
therefore, there will be no organization formation inW , no ex-post coalition formation and
consequently, no ex-ante democracy.
3.2 Dominant elites
Moore (1964) observes that the presence of a dominant elite results in dictatorship, not
democracy. One way to model a dominant elite in our setting is to let the ex-ante probability
that  = 1 be q  1
2
. In other words, the two elites are not ex-ante symmetric in the sense
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that there is a bias in the probability with which one of the two elites become dominant.
In such a situation, even when we maintain the assumptions under which Proposition 2
is valid, as long as q close enough to 1, there will be no unanimous agreement to extend
democracy. The relevant inequality that needs to be satised for the dominant elite to
agree to democracy is
qu(1) + (1  q)u(0)  qu(1  g   f) + (1  q)u(g) (4)
and as f > 0, when q = 1, the direction of inequality (4) will be reversed and by continuity,
this reversal will persist when q is close to 1. Of course, at the other extreme, when q is
close to 1
2
, by continuity if (3) holds as a strict inequality so will (4). Moreover, as the
LHS of (4) is increasing in q and the RHS of (3) is monotone in q, there is a q > 1
2
and
q < 1, such that when q  q, (3) holds while when q > q, the direction of the inequality is
reversed.
4 Some empirical patterns
In this section we provide and discuss empirical evidence that supports the formal analysis
developed here. To this end, it is useful to state four patterns that emerge from our formal
analysis:
1. In the absence of ethnic bias, intra-elite conict between equally powerful elites is a
precondition for the transition to democracy;
2. Democracy lowers the cost of, and promotes, political activity;
3. The bargaining power of a fully organized non-elite can be small i.e. the non-elite
median voter van be weak;
4. The transition to democracy doesnt rely on interest alignment between sections of
the elites and non elites following on from modern capitalistic development.
Only point 4 needs more explanation. An important literature links the transition to
democracy with modern industrial development as in Lizzeri and Persico (2004), Llavador
and Oxoby (2005) and Galor and Moav (2006). In these papers, the transition to democ-
racy is driven by class complementarity or interest alignment between sections of the elite
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and non-elite, which follows the modern capitalistic development. In contrast, in our pa-
per, neither technological change nor a di¤erent mix of production factors are needed to
generate the coalition among classes leading democracy. Therefore in our model, economic
development in itself is neither a su¢ cient nor a necessary element for the emergence of
democracy.18
4.1 Pattern 1: Intra-elite conict and coalitions
Collier (1999) classies three di¤erent patterns which historically led to democratization:
i) middle sector mobilization, ii) electoral support mobilization and iii) joint project. In ii),
democratization is the outcome of bargaining between political elites and he considers the
following cases: Switzerland 1848, Chile 1847/41 , Britain 1867 and 1884, Norway 1898,
Italy 1912, Uruguay 1918. In i) the democratization is an outcome of the conict between
political elite and economically rising middle-class (what we can consider as economical
elites). This is the case of: Denmark 1849, Greece 1864, France 1848 and 1875, Argentina
1912, Portugal 1911 and 1918, Spain 1868, 1890 and 1931. In iii), where the working
class played an active role alongside one of the two elites, Collier includes, Denmark 1915,
Finland 1906 and 1919, Sweden 1907 and 1918, Netherlands 1917, Belgium 1918, Germany
1918, Britain 1918.
In what follows we analyze, in detail, some of these cases and also the establishment of
democracy to India, a case that has received surprisingly little attention from the literature.
European Countries
There is some agreement among historians and political scientists that the elites in
Britain had conicting interests. Olson (1993) traces the origin of such fragmentation in
the English civil war in the 17th century and writes. There were no lasting winners in the
English civil wars. The di¤erent tendencies in British Protestantism and the economic and
social forces with which they were linked were more or less evenly matched. The political
environment after the Glorious Revolution led to the competition between rural aristocracy
18This is not to say that development and democracy are completely unrelated. In our model democracy
and development can be linked by the fact that economic development can be associated with the rise of
strong industrial elite able to compete with traditional rural landowning. aristocracy.
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and industrial capital (Olson 1993), which paved the way for franchise extension in the mid-
Nineteenth century. Moore (1966) claims instead that this division was the result of the
British capitalistic evolution, where part of the landed upper class and the gentry who
transformed themselves into capitalists generated a di¤erent and equally strong elite, the
upper bourgeoisie.19
The British parliament prior to 1832 was dominated either directly or indirectly by
the big landlords. The 1832 Reform act established the right to vote based uniformly on
property and income. It extended franchise to 14% of male population, roughly the entire
middle class (Smellie 1949 and Collier 1999). The 1832 act gave the de jure power to a
section of the economic elite who were unrepresented under existing electoral arrangements.
We may argue that it avoided the alliance between bourgeoisie and working class that 44
years before leaded in France to the revolution. Accordingly, the landscape after the reform
of 1832 was the one described by our model with two conicting elites, who represented in
the parliament by the Conservatives and the Liberalsagreed to extend, with the largely
bipartisan reform of 1867, franchise to a large part of the working class, a task that was
completed by the reform in 1888 when about 60% of male adult were enfranchised.
The turmoil of the French revolution and the restoration of monarchy following the
Vienna Congress resulted, in France, in a social environment dominated by two elites with
conicting interests. One elite, supporting the Republican party, mainly consisted of indus-
trialists and professionals, and the other elite, mainly consisting of landowners, supported
the monarchist party, while the working class was weak and still not organized (Elwitt
(1975) pp. 5 and Luebbert (1991) pp. 37). In this context an episode can illustrate the
bargaining relationship emphasized in the model: universal male su¤rage was introduced
in France 1848. When a social reform agenda was passed thanks to the alliance between
the working class and republicans, a conservative government disenfranchised 2.8 million
of men in 1850. However, in 1851 the Republicans and the working class supported the
coup led by Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, who restored the universal su¤rage, initially only
formally and from 1868, under the pressure of Republicans and working classes more sub-
stantially by establishing the freedom of organization previously banned (Collier 1999, pp.
42-43 and Elwitt pp. 41).
19The political struggles related to the Corn Laws are often presented as the most evident sign of the
division among industrialist and rural elites.
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Unlike France and Britain, Italy, Germany and Japan did not pass through historical
episodes that weakened the traditional aristocracy and created conditions leading to intra-
elite competition. In fact, the landed aristocracy was strengthened by their involvement
in reunication process both in Germany and in Italy and by prestigious external military
victories in Japan. Therefore, in all these three countries, the landed aristocracy was
still dominant in the second half on nineteenth century. The oligarchic structure in Italy,
Germany and Japan was mainly achieved through an incorporation of a weak bourgeoisie
in an authoritarian state, and the landed aristocracy was still hegemonic in this alliance
...a commercial and industrial class which is too weak and dependent to take the power
and rule in its own right [...] throws itself into the arms of the landed aristocracy and the
royal bureaucracy. (Moore (1964), pp. 435-437).
In Germany, Bismarcks so called revolution from above (Moore 1962, pp. 433) was
a strategy to preserve the conservative absolutist order, in his own words to "overthrow
parliaments with parliamentary means". Popular participation in the Germany government
was strongly mitigated by institutional restrictions and the voting system was controlled
by the Junker landlords. Similarly, mainly rural oligarchies governed in Italy and Japan
until the establishment of their respective fascist governments between the 1920s and the
1930s, and after short-lived weak democracies (the Weimar Republic, the Taisho¯ democracy
in Japan, and Giolittis governments in Italy). All main political gures: Bismarck in
Germany, Cavour in Italy and the statesmen of the Meiji era embodied the interests of
the landed aristocracy, and were deep conservative loyalists themselves. Even during the
subsequent dictatorships, the landed aristocracy often maintained a strong position.20
India
India is the worlds biggest and one of its more stable democracies. In the more than
50 years since the rst election, there have been 15 general elections and over 300 state
elections. Both at the state level and at the centre, governments have always been elected
by people with a reasonably high level of rotation among political organizations.21 As
20In Italy for example, fascist leaders used to declare that fascism was "ruralizing Italy" and Mussolini
promoted an strongly autarchic economic policy "la battaglia del grano" (the battle of wheat) throughout
his rule.
21Although the Congress has traditionally been the dominating force, in 1977 it is thrown out. In 1980
it was voted back and in 1989 elections it was voted out again. In 1991, the Congress came back to power
again.
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it has been extensively documented, India enjoys a free media, freedom of assembly and
association.
The decision to extend the franchise was voted unanimously by the constituent assembly,
which also declared India an Independent state. The constituent assembly was elected via a
process of indirect elections, organized in provincial legislatures elected in early 1946, using
the 1935 act of franchise, mainly based on landowning. The electors constituted about 10
percent of the entire population (Sarkar 2001). Therefore, the constituent assembly can be
considered to be representative of the elites and franchise extension in India was a one-shot
decision rather than a dynamic process.
At the onset of the constituent assembly, the elites were constituted by large landown-
ers and the industrial urban class often in conict within each other. These divisions were
already present in the Moguls era but they were further exacerbated by the English rulers,
who implemented the policy of "divide and rule", trying to prevent the formation of any
coalition that could represent a threat . British rulers favoured and rested mainly on the
support of Indian rural upper classes: native princes and large landlords.22 In contrast,
British colonialism did not favour Indian commercial and industrial elites, to prevent com-
petition with their English counterparts who, for long time, sought protection, subsidy, and
opportunities for monopolistic exploitation of the Indian market (Moore 1966, pp 371). This
bias toward rural elites alienated the commercial and professional class generated a clear
split between rural and urban elites in India. Accordingly, the British strategy resulted in
the fact that the urban elite did not form a coalition with the powerful landed aristocracy,
in a fashion which generated the dictatorial drift in Japan, Italy and Germany. The conict
between urban intellectual elites and rural big and medium farmers is a common element
present in the history of Indian Democracy.
In this respect India di¤ered from Pakistan. Geographically, Pakistan consists of regions
which- during British colonialism- were characterized by mainly rural economy, dominated
by Muslim Punjabi landlords.23 The Punjabi elites, consisting mainly of the landed aris-
tocracy (e.g. Kohli, 2001, pp. 5) were the core of the Muslim League who decided the
22In the most important court there was a British resident advisor.
23Until 1971, the presence of a Bengali-muslim population in Pakistan generated a conict with the west
Pakistani majority, but their political power has always been small (Rashiduzzaman 1982). In 1971, the
Bengali minority, with the help of India, obtained their independence with the formation of Bangladesh.
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constitutional design of the country, and obtained partition from the rest of India. Al-
though the creation of Pakistani democracy was contemporaneous with Indian democracy,
it has never been stable with four major military coups (1958, 1969, 1977, 1999).
The following episode is a useful illustration of the coalition dynamics underlined in
our model. Indira Gandhis attempt to mount a coup (by imposing "Emergency") in 1975
culminated with the lost of the enormous popular support she had hitherto enjoyed and
indeed, she called and lost elections in 1977. Even though she promised more redistribution
to the non elite, this commitment was not credible and an alliance consisting of the non-elite
with anti-Congress parties opposed her.24
The degree of ethnic conict in India has always been less serious than for example in
African countries. The fact that the Congress organization and the coalition of organiza-
tions in power at the central government during the di¤erent legislatures are not organized
on an ethnic basis supports this claim (Horowitz 1985). Indeed, we showed that if part of
non elites say Wi, have ethnic linkages with part of the elites Ei; and for these reasons Wi
has some non monetary disutility bi in allying with Ej; j 6= i, democracy will not emerge
in equilibrium when bi is large. The lower level of inter-ethnic conict in Indian society is
perhaps due to the geographic dispersion of Indian ethnic groups, which made them eco-
nomically complementary and lower the level of b. And perhaps due to sanskritisation and
castes institutions, which to a certain extend reect horizontal divisions rather than verti-
cal ethnic-type division. On the contrary, when di¤erent ethnic groups are concentrated in
di¤erent regions of the country, it is more likely that non-elites will not ally horizontally
with each other, but prefer to ally vertically with the elites of the same ethnic group.
In Nigeria after independence three essentially ethnic organizations had emerged: the
Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) drawing its support from the Hausa and Fulani tribes
of the North, the Action Group (AG), drawing its support from the Yoruba tribes of West-
ern Nigeria, and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) relying on
the support of the Igbo of Eastern Nigeria. This clear regional divide was inherited from
the British colonial period, where the South East, the South West and the North admin-
istrations were in practice ruled as fully independent units.25 Interestingly, community
24Kohli (2001) notes: "The fact that she was voted out of power following the emergency only conrm
the e¢ cacy of Indian democracy".
25The nationalistic party that after the independence forced the creation of a single state.
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identities were so strong in shaping economic participation and social di¤erentiation that
a clear divide between classes did not emerge (Forrest pp. 24, 1993). Furthermore, we note
that these three macro-regions are still today economically autonomous entities, predom-
inantly agrarian in terms of employed labor force (more than 70 percent). The two rainy
southern regions is where, historically, the production of staple tree and root crops is con-
centrated while the drier north is where the production of grains is concentrated (Olaloku
et al. 1979).
The vertical ethnical division resulted, in Nigeria, in a series unstable democratic
regimes. The rst elections held in Nigeria in 1959 saw the victory of the NPC, which
after one year declared the state of emergency in the western region whose local govern-
ment, leaded by the AG, was proscribed and its leader arrested. The non elites, did not
reject this outcome and instead of turning compact against the elites who disenfranchised
them, they split along the ethnic and geographic lines, which lead the country to a long
civil war that lasted until 1970 (Ake 1985).
4.2 Pattern 2: The cost and organization of political activity
It is quite incontroversial that democracy does not prevent and, on the contrary, encour-
ages collective political activity. The constitutions of all main democracies dedicate one
important article to the freedom of association or (/and) organization formation. In what
follows we provide a sample consisting of the oldest and largest democracies.
 Canada: constitution act article 2 point d, guarantees freedom of association.
 France: article 4 (Title I) states Political organizations and groups shall contribute
to the exercise of su¤rage. They shall be formed and carry on their activities freely
(...).
 Germany, article 9 (freedom of association) states All Germans have the right to
form associations and societies.
 Japan, article 21, (...) Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press
and all other forms of expression are guaranteed (...).
 India, article 19 point c , freedom to form associations or unions;
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 Italy, article 18 (freedom of association) Citizens have the right freely and without
authorization to form associations for those aims not forbidden by criminal law.
 Turkey, article 33, Everyone has the right to form associations, or become a member
of an association, or withdraw from membership without prior permission..
 US: 1st amendment, (...) the right of the people peaceably to assemble (...).
On the other side, Dahl (1989, p. 241) for the period 1981-85 classies 85 countries (out
of 168) as completely non democratic and notice that 70 among them have a total control
of non-state collective organizations.
European Countries
In Great Britain, after the 1867 Reform Act, parties began to organize themselves as
mass organizations and create institutions needed to compete at a national level (Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2006, p. 179). Several small socialist groups had formed around this time
with the intention of linking the movement to political policies. Among these were the
Independent Labour Party, the intellectual and largely middle-class Fabian Society, the
Social Democratic Federation and the Scottish Labour Party, this leads in 1900 to the
formation of the Labour Representation Committee a centralized parties representing the
working class. Furthermore, mass mobilization was achieved also through the creation of the
national Union of Conservative Associations in 1867, and the National Liberal Federation
in 1877, with the aim of coordinating and organizing local associations constituted mainly
by workmens classes (Beattie 1970, pp. 138-144).26
In France, the elections in 1848 under manhood universal su¤rage, prompted the for-
mation of the rst mass organization, Republican Solidarity. This organization established
branches in sixty-two of Francess eighty-six departments and rapidly acquired about thirty-
thousand members in 353 branches and it was formed by bourgeois, petty bourgeois and
working class (Aminzade .1993, pp. 29-32).27 Interestingly, Luis Napoleon during the initial
26Taken literally, our model explains the formation of a single party for the non elites, but this is only
the result of simplifying assumptions. In principle, non-elite can organize themselves in di¤erent bodies
and also by joining preexisting parties, this would not change the nature of our results to the extent that
the resulting organizations successfully coordinate to mobilize the non-elites in case of disenfranchisement
threats.
27For example in the city of Toulouse the most outspoken republican militants were: 55% belonging to
the working class, 21% bourgeois and 21% petty bourgeois.
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repressive years of his regime declared Republican Solidarity illegal, but he never restricted
su¤rage. Republican Solidarity then almost disappeared, but it was revived with success
in 1868, when Napoleon restored the formal democracy by removing the ban to any form
of collective political activity.
India
The mass mobilization in India is a more complicated phenomenon than in the western
European countries since it is inherently linked with the nationalistic and anticolonial
movement. The Congress party, founded at the end of the nineteenth century became
a mass organization after the rst World War, in large part due to Gandhi. It is also
interesting to notice that the Lahore demand for independence in 1929 was accompanied
by a sharpening of the notion of democracy. The Nehru Report of 1928 suggested adult
franchise and from the Faizpur session of 1936 onwards the Congress made a Constituent
assembly elected by universal su¤rage one of its central demands (Sarkar 2001, p. 29).
4.3 Pattern 3: The weak median voter
European Countries
A necessary condition for the democratization is that the ability of the working class
to extract surplus is limited and that the organized working class on its own is weak (and
becomes powerful only if allied with one elite). This is clearly consistent with Przeworski
(1997) who notes:
Here it may be worth noting that democratic system was solidied in Bel-
gium, Sweden, France and Great Britain only after organized workers were badly
defeated in mass strikes and adopted a docile posture as a result.,(Przeworski
(1997, p. 133)
In the UK, the enfranchised classes represented in the parliament by the Conservatives
and the Liberals agreed to extend, with the reform of 1867, franchise to a large part of the
working class, a task that was completed by the reform in 1888 when about 60% of male
adult were enfranchised. In general this second wave of enfranchisement does not seem
to be due to the strength of the working class. On the contrary, there is some agreement
that the working class in England was too weak to represent a serious threat as Lizzeri and
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Persico (2004) argue. The democratic demand from the lower class was represented by the
Chartist movement, whose revolutionary power had its peak in the demonstration of 1848
that was brutally crushed. Therefore, one can argue that the Chartist movement did not
necessarily entail a real chance of revolution in Britain (Wende 1999, pp. 147).
Similarly in France during the Pariscommune, where the urban working classwithout
the alliance of the Republicansseized the power and governed Paris for few months was
crushed by the troops of the Third Republic, which supports the claim, also put forward by
Elwitt (1975) and Luebbert (1991), on the weakness of the working class as an autonomous
force in France.
What about the ex-post capacity (the political power) of surplus extraction of the me-
dian voter in the European countries in the period immediately after the democratization?
Democracy spreads in most of the Western Europe in the period 1830-1920. Aidt, Dutta
and Loukoianova (2006) analyze 12 European countries in this period and nd that en-
franchisement generated low increases in welfare expenditure and a shift of the government
expenditure from justice and police to infrastructure provision. The low increase in wel-
fare expenditure seems consistent with claim that the de facto power of the working class
remained low after enfranchisement.
India
Indian democracy has done very little to increase the living standard of the majority of
Indian citizens. As Weiner notes:
The incorporation into the political system of backward caste elites and
members of scheduled castes has apparently done little to reduce the enormous
social and economic disparities that persist in Indias hierarchical and inegal-
itarian social order. That raises the fundamental question: if there are now
so many OBC and scheduled castes bureaucrats and politicians, why is not re-
ected in state policies to promote the well being of their communities? (...)
Why has the increase in political power for members of the lower castes done
so little to raise these communities?(Weiner (2001) pp 211).
Weiners observations are supported by Figure 4, depicting the index of wealth concen-
tration and relative poverty in India from 1946- the date of the constituent assembly, which
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allowed for universal su¤rage- to the early 1990s.28 We can observe that income inequality
and relative poverty has no downward tendlittle or no redistribution has taken place.29
Altogether, the funds allocated for the three main antipoverty programs constituted only
the 4% of the total allocation in the plan where this project took place.30
Furthermore, we can observe very little evidence of extensive education provision; the
share of individuals above 25 years that completed the rst level is very low, 6.3% in 1960,
11 years after the rst election. And it does not appear to be much higher in 1990, 8.5%,
after 41 years of democracy.31 Moreover there is a widespread consensus that level of health
care is persistently neglected in many part of India. For example, Sen (1995) states:
If we were to look back at what has happened in India in the rst four
decades of planned development, two general failures appear particularly glar-
ing. First, in contrast with what was promised by the political leadership which
took India to independence, very little has been achieved in "the ending of
poverty and ignorance and disease and inequality of opportunity" [...]. Four
decades of allegedly "interventionist" planning did little to make the country
literate, provide a wide-based health service, achieve comprehensive land re-
forms, or end the rampant social inequalities that blight the material prospects
of the underprivileged.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
The policy after independence mainly favoured agrarian, industrial and professional
urban elites. The agrarian reform was not redistributive; there was a transfer of ownership
from absentee landlords to enterprising rich farmers, who beneted also from policy of price
support, subsidized inputs and institutional credits (Bardhan pp. 46 1988).32 Substantial
help was also addressed to industrialists, mainly from a few top Western Indian business
families, with strong protectionist policies of import substitution, trade restriction, and
28Gini index and last income quintile: Deininger and Squire, High quality Dataset. GDP per capita
growth: Penn Table.
29Deininger and Squire, High quality Dataset.
30Brass 1990.
31Barro and Lee Dataset.
32By 1975 the big farmers (more than 4 hec) constituting 19 percent of the rural population accounted
for 60 percent of cultivated area.
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large public provision of capital goods, intermediate goods, infrastructural facilities for
private rms often at articially low prices (Bardhan pp. 41-47). Also the professionals
and high level bureaucrats were favoured by the government policy. In a country were the
illiteracy is so widespread, this class beneted from educational expenditure. In India, total
expenditure on education has been generally lower than comparable developing countries
and a disproportionate share of the education budget has gone into higher education and to
provide grants-in-aid to private schools with very little left for primary education (Weiner
1999, pp. 214). This policy favoured the educated urban classes by helping their children for
secondary education and maintaining their monopoly as human capital owners (Bardhan,
1988 pp. 52).
There is a high level of fragmentation of lower castes. The caste system was an insti-
tutional way to organize this fragmentation, but at the same time, it perpetrated these
divisions. A proof of this political weakness is represented by the general weakness of the
Communist organizations in India. They have never been strong at a central level, and,
when they gained power at the state level, as in West Bengal, they have always supported
moderate policies of redistribution rather than dramatic change in the economic system.
Therefore, we can argue that Indian lower classes would never be able to have an high level
of bargaining power on its own (i:e:f is su¢ ciently small).
4.4 Pattern 4: Growth and democracy
Is democracy linked to industrial development? The evidence on this issue is moot. There
is a relatively old debate on the so-called "modernization theory" that democratization
naturally follows the development process. This was initially fuelled by an article of Lipset
(1959) subsequently criticized by Luebbert (1991) and ODonnel (1973) among others. O
Donnel , in particular, argues that the collapse of democracy in Latin-America in the 1960s
and 1970s undermined the condence in the modernization-promoted democracy. The In-
dian experience (at least till the late 1980s) provides an example of a reasonably stable
democracy in an stagnating economy (in gure 1 we show the Indian GDP growth rate
until 1990). Furthermore, if is true that in some western countries like Britain, Sweden and
France, the process of industrialization was closely associated with a process of democra-
tization, it is also true that in some other countries like Germany, Italy and Japan equally
impressive episodes of industrialization led to totalitarian regimes. Consistently with this
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observation, recent empirical evidence casts serious doubt on the causality from economic
development to democratization (Przeworski et. al. (2000), Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson,
Yared (2005), and Persson and Tabellini (2006)).33
5 Final Remarks
The following quote is a good way of summarizing our main result:
In a country where the elements in the dominant coalition are diverse,
and each su¢ ciently strong to exert pressures and pulls in di¤erent directions,
political democracy may have slightly better chance, than in other developing
countries,(...). This is based not so much on the strength of the liberal value
system in its political culture as on the procedural usefulness of democracy as
an impersonal (at least arbitrary) rule of negotiation, demand articulation and
bargaining within coalition, and as a device by which one partner may keep the
other partners at the bargaining table within some moderate boundsBardhan
(1984, p.77).
In particular, our model claries how democracy can be seen as a negotiation device
by which competing elites ensure a mutually fair share of the surplus by handing formal
power to a weak non-elite median voter.
Possible directions for future research include investigating, more generally, voting mod-
els with an endogenously weak median voter, understanding the provision of and funding
of public goods with a weak median voter and studying the link between secessionist move-
ments and democratic institutions.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of lemma 1
We use the idea of a stochastically stable equilibrium developed by Young (1993) (see also
Charness and Jackson (2007)). Let g be an arbitrary nite normal form game with a set
of N players, an action set Ai for each player and a payo¤ function ui : i=Ni=1 Ai ! <.
Suppose each player believes that whenever any other player chooses to play a specic
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action, with probability ", 0 < " < 1, she ends up choosing some other action in Ai. Let
g(") denote the perturbed game. A state in g(") is a prole of actions. For each state, let
each player pick a best response to that state in g("). Associated with each best-response is
a function  from the set of states to itself. When " is small enough, let the set of 0s that
remain best responses for all smaller " be denoted by A(g). Any  2 A(g), together with "
denes a Markov process over the set of states that is both irreducible and aperiodic and
therefore has a unique steady-state distribution. A stochastically stable state is one which
has positive probability under the limit of the steady state distribution of the preceding
Markov process as " goes to zero for any selection  2 A(g). If a state is both a Nash
equilibrium of g and a stochastically stable, then it is said to be a stochastically stable
equilibrium of g.
As matters stand, we cant apply, in a straightforward way, the denition of a stochas-
tically stable equilibrium to select between the two equilibria in the coordination game
played by non-party members in W . The reason for this is that there is a continuum of
individuals, of unit measure, in W while the denition of stochastic stability presupposes
a game with a nite number of players. Instead, we take a sequence of nite subsets of
players in W (equivalently, a nite grid contained in the unit interval) whose limit is W
(equivalently, whose limit is the unit interval). Let ~Nj, j  1; be a sequence of nite grids
contained in the unit interval so that limj!1 ~Nj = [0; 1]. LetNj = # ~Nj. We call a sequence
of nite grids admissible if (i) there is a threshold Nj for each j such that limj!1
Nj
Nj
= ^,
(ii) the payo¤ to a party member is u(f)  c if the number party members is greater than
or equal to Nj and is  c otherwise, (iii) the payo¤ to a non-party member is zero. For an
equilibrium to be stochastically stable in the coordination game played by individuals in
W , it must be the limit of the sequence of stochastically stable equilibria of all admissible
sequences of nite grids converging to the unit interval.
Fix j and consider ~Nj. For ~" small enough, if at least Nj individuals join the party,
then the best response of each non-party member must be to choose join the party as well.
Similarly, if at most N 1 join the party, then the best response of each non-party member
must be to join the party. Let #Npj be the number of party members. In states where
#Npj =
Nj   1, choosing either of the two options, join the party or not join the party,
are possible best responses for an individual. It follows that that best responses di¤er only
in states where #Npj = Nj   1. Now, consider the associated Markov process for small
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~". There are two recurrent communication classes34, one where all individuals choose to
join the party (labelled a1) and one in which all individuals choose not to join the party
(labelled a2). By Theorem 4 in Young (1993), only states in a recurrent communication
class with least resistance will have positive probability weight in the limit of the steady
state distribution of the Markov process as ~" goes to zero. Consider the state a2. Then,
(i) there is a best response selection such that given Nj   Nj + 2 errors, the best response
of each individual is to be in a1 and (ii) there is a best response selection such that given
Nj   Nj + 1 errors, the best response of each individual is to be in a1. Therefore, the
minimum resistance of leaving the state a2, depending on the selection made, is either
N   N +1 or N   N +2. It follows that the minimum resistance of a tree oriented from the
state a2 to the state a1, depending on the best response selection made, is either Nj  Nj+1
or Nj  Nj+2. Next, consider the state a1. Then, (i) there is a best response selection such
that given Nj   1 errors, the best response of each individual is to be in a2 and (ii) there is
a best response selection such that given Nj 2 errors, the best response of each individual
is to be in a2. Therefore, the minimum resistance of leaving the state a1, depending on the
best response selection is either Nj 1 or Nj 2. It follows that the minimum resistance of
a tree oriented from the state a1 to the state a2, depending on the best response selection
made, is also either Nj   1 or Nj   2. The state a1 is the unique stochastically stable
equilibrium if and only if both Nj   Nj + 1 < Nj   1 and Nj   Nj + 2 < Nj   2 or
equivalently, both Nj >
Nj+2
2
and Nj >
Nj+4
2
. As Nj+2
2
>
Nj+4
2
, if Nj   2 > Nj2 , the state
a1 is the unique stochastically stable equilibrium. Rewriting these inequalities, it follows
that state a1 is the unique stochastically stable equilibrium if and only if
Nj 2
Nj
> 1
2
. As
j ! 1, for any admissible sequence of nite grids, Nj 2
Nj
! ^ and therefore, when ^ > 1
2
,
the unique stochastically stable equilibrium is one where all non-party members do not join
the party or equivalently, when ^ < 1
2
, the unique stochastically stable equilibrium is one
where all non-party members join the party.
34For the denition of the terms "recurrent communication classes", "resistance" and "minimum sto-
chastic potential" in this proof, see Young (1993).
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6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Inequality (3) is equivalent to
Z 1
1 g f
u0(x)dx 
Z g
0
u0(x)dx: (5)
When both elites are risk-neutral i.e. u00(:) = 0, by computation, it follows that as 1  
(1  g   f) = g + f > g, the direction of the inequality (3) is always reversed. Therefore,
risk-aversion is a necessary condition for equilibrium enfranchisement. However, when
u00(:) < 0, as 1  (1  g) = g and 0 < g,
Z g
0
u0(x)dx >
Z 1
1 g
u0(x)dx
and therefore, as long as f is small enough, (3) will hold.
6.3 Endogenising the grabbing function
We show how the grabbing function can be endogenously derived as the outcomes of a
process of sequential bilateral Nash bargains, where rst, a coalition of two classes bargains
with a class and second, given the surplus appropriated at the proceeding stage, each class
in the coalition bargains with each other.
For each pair of coalitions ,0, 0 2   (), we model the raw force of a coalition by
its disagreement function d;0(). Measuring the surplus  is able to appropriate in the
event of civil war against 0: Moreover, for each  2   and 0 2   (), there is a continuous
function c : [0; 1] ! [0; 1] with d0;() = c (d;0()) such that whenever 0 < d;0() < 1,
d;0() + c (d;0()) < 1 but limd;0 ()!1 c (d;0()) = 0 and limd;0 ()!0 c (d;0()) = 1
so that there is surplus destruction after the civil war but the surplus destruction is
minimal when one coalition or class completely overwhelms the other. Finally, we as-
sume that both dfW ;Ejg;fEig (i) and dfWg;fEig () are continuous and increasing in  with
lim!0 dfWg;fEjg (i) = 0 and lim!0 dfW ;Ejg;fEig (i) = dfEjg;fEig (i).
Our analysis of sequential Nash bargaining proceeds by backward induction. First, when
both ; 0 each consists of a single class (labelled as k; l), and the available social surplus
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is s > 0, the Nash bargaining outcome is the solution to the maximization problem:
max
ck;cl
(u(gks)  u(dfkg;flgs))
 
u(gls)  u(dflg;fkgs)

At an interior solution, the rst-order conditions characterizing the solution to this maxi-
mization problem is:
u0(gks)
(u(gks)  u(dfkg;flgs)) =
u0((1  gk)s) 
u((1  gk)s)  u(dflg;fkgs)

Note that when dfkg;flg increases the LHS of the proceeding equality increases and there-
fore, as u00(:) < 0, gk must increase to maintain equality. Therefore, gk, viewed as function
of dfkg;flg and dflg;fkg, is continuous in both arguments, increasing in dfkg;flg but decreas-
ing in dflg;fkg. Moreover, if dfkg;flg > dflg;fkg, gk > gl. As dfkg;flg ! 0, by assumption,
limdl;k()!0 c (dl;k()) = 1 and therefore, in the limit, gk ! 0 and gl ! 1.
Next, we dene the "utility function" of a coalition of classes fk; lg as the value function
Vfk;lg (s) derived from the solution to the Nash Bargaining maximization problem between
k; l for a xed s. Note that by standard results in duality, Vfk;lg (s) is an increasing,
concave function of s. When the coalition fk; lg bargains with the class fmg, then the
Nash bargaining outcome is the solution to the following maximization problem:
max
ci
(u(gm)  u(dfmg;fk;lg)))
 
Vfk;lg
 
gfk;lg
  V(dfk;lg;fmg))
At an interior solution, the FOC is:
u0(gm)
(u(gm)  u(dfmg;fk;lg))) =
V 0fk;lg(1  gm) 
Vfk;lg (1  gm)  V(dfk;lg;fmg))

Using arguments identical to those used before, gm, viewed as function of dfmg;fk;lg and
dfk;lg;fmg, is continuous in both arguments, increasing in dfmg;fk;lg but decreasing in dfk;lg;fmg
and if dfmg;fk;lg > dfk;lg;fmg, gm > 12 and whenever dfk;lg;fmg ! 0, gfk;lg ! 0 and gm ! 1.
By an appropriate change of notation, dene
g(fkg ; flg ; ) = gk(dfkg;flg () ; dflg;fkg ())
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and
g(fmg ; fk; lg ; ) = gm(dfmg;fk;lg () ; dfk;lg;fmg ()):
It follows that under the assumptions made d;0() so far, we have that (i) g(; 0; ) =
1 g(0; ; ), (ii) g(Ej; Ei; i) < g(Ei; Ej; i), (iii) lim!0 g(W ; Ei; ) = 0 and lim!0 g(fW ; Ejg ; Ei; i) =
g(Ej; Ei; i), (iv) both g (fW ; Eig ; Ej; ) and g(W ; Ei; ) are increasing in  and nally,
(v) f() is continuous in :
Therefore, all the properties of the g(; 0; ) used in the text can be derived by a process
of sequential Nash bargaining.
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